Regional and Global Capital Flows: Macroeconomic Causes and Consequences, NBER-EASE Volume 10 by Shin-ichi Fukuda
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Regional and Global Capital Flows: Macroeconomics Causes
and Consequences, NBER-EASE Volume 10
Volume Author/Editor: Takatoshi Ito and Anne O. Krueger, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-38676-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ito_01-1
Publication Date: January 2001
Chapter Title: The Impacts of Bank Loans on Economic Development: An
Implication for East Asia from an Equilibrium Contract Theory
Chapter Author: Shin-ichi Fukuda
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10733
Chapter pages in book: (p. 117 - 150)
4
The Impacts of Bank Loans
on Economic Development
An Implication for East Asia from
an Equilibrium Contract Theory
Shin-ichi Fukuda
4.1 Introduction
In the 1990s, ﬁnancial liberalization expanded the volume of private
capital ﬂows to developing countries. In particular, the miraculous eco-
nomic success of East Asia attracted a large share of industrialized coun-
tries’ private capital to the region. As a result, the East Asian economies
(e.g., Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea) accumulated signiﬁcant amounts
of unhedged short-term external liabilities before 1997. It is now widely
recognized that a large fraction of short-term external liabilities was one
of the main reasons why the East Asian countries experienced the serious
crisis. A large number of studies have suggested that otherwise solvent
East Asian countries might have suﬀered from a short-run liquidity prob-
lem because the available stock of reserves was low relative to the overall
burden of external debt service (interest payments plus the renewal of
loans coming to maturity).1 This implies that if a large fraction of external
liabilities had longer maturities, the East Asian crisis might not have taken
place in the form of a liquidity shortage.
Interestingly, time series evidence suggests that the degree of postcrisis
capital mobility in East Asia was quite diﬀerent in four forms of capital
inﬂows: direct investment, portfolio investment, bank loans, and other in-
vestments. For example, table 4.1 reports the quarterly and annual data
Shin-ichi Fukuda is associate professor of economics at the University of Tokyo.
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1. See, for example, Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1998); Radelet and Sachs (1998); Fur-
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.series of International Financial Statistics (IFS) to show how capital in-
ﬂows to the East Asian economies changed before and after the crisis.
Both quarterly and annual data (i.e., tables 4.1 and 4.2) show that before
1997 all forms of net private capital inﬂows tended to increase among the
East Asian countries, including Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea. However,
the quarterly data in table 4.1 also indicate that inﬂows of both bank loans
Table 4.2 Capital Inﬂows to the East Asian Economies Before and After the East Asian
Crisis, Annual Data
92 93 94 95 96 97 98
A. Direct Investment (IMF Code  78bed)
Thailand 2113 1804 1366 2068 2336 3746 6941
Indonesia 1777 2004 2109 4346 6194 4677 356
Korea 728 589 810 1776 2326 2844 5415
Malaysia 5183 5006 4342 4178 5078 5106 n.a.
The
Philippines 228 1238 1591 1478 1517 1222 1713
China 11156 27515 33787 35849 40180 44236 43751
Singapore 2204 4686 8550 7206 7883 9710 7218
B. Portfolio Investment (IMF Code  78bgd)
Thailand 924 5455 2486 4083 3585 4798 159
Indonesia 88 1805 3877 4100 5005 2632 2002
Korea 4953 10553 8149 13875 21183 12287 292
Malaysia 1122 709 1649 436 268 248 n.a.
The
Philippines 155 897 901 2619 5126 600 276
China 393 3646 3923 710 2372 7703 97
Singapore 1398 2867 114 410 1672 590 1258
C. Bank Loans (IMF Code  78bud)
Thailand 1758 6589 14295 13218 2909 3522 11382
Indonesia n.a. 1357 527 1953 758 276 2470
Korea 1820 720 7368 11389 9952 9785 6233
Malaysia 3150 6282 3789 468 2974 807 n.a.
The
Philippines 1921 229 1694 1648 5036 1668 405
China 786 415 5222 4045 5959 n.a. 3151
Singapore 5146 1949 5409 4423 8032 18687 12787
D. Other Investment excluding Bank Loans (IMF Code  78bid78bud)
Thailand 4721 150 4456 6165 8967 18659 6017
Indonesia n.a. 822 2065 463 1006 2194 5475
Korea 3104 2175 6264 10061 14619 1468 7635
Malaysia 33 1159 1880 4211 1633 1933 n.a.
The
Philippines 1019 2684 1868 1392 1334 2728 261
China 3296 161 3726 9161 7241 n.a. 5469
Singapore 45 6375 502 7558 7814 17405 3076
Source: IMF (1997, 2000).
Note: Unit  millions of U.S. dollars.
Impacts of Bank Loans on Economic Development 119and portfolio investments turned out to be negative after the crisis in these
East Asian countries.2 In particular, except for in the Philippines, bank
loans turned from inﬂows to large outﬂows after the crisis and remained
until the end of the sample period. This implies that the crisis was accom-
panied by a signiﬁcant amount of bank loan withdrawal from the East
Asian countries. In contrast, except for Indonesia, inﬂows of direct invest-
ment never declined in the East Asian countries, even after the crisis in
table 4.1. Instead, inﬂows of direct investment steadily increased in Thai-
land and were quite stable in Korea after the crisis.
The evidence implies that if a large fraction of external liabilities had
been ﬁnanced by direct investment, the East Asian crisis might not have
taken place in the form of a liquidity shortage. In other words, a liquidity
shortage in the East Asian crisis was attributable to highly mobile forms
of capital inﬂows, particularly by commercial bank debt. It is probably
true that liquidity problems emerged in several Asian countries when pan-
icking external creditors became unwilling to roll over existing short-term
bank loans in 1997. However, a pure liquidity shortage could have taken
place for any short-term forms of external liabilities. Thus, it is not neces-
sarily clear why commercial bank loans played a leading role in causing a
liquidity shortage in the East Asian economies.
In domestic ﬁnancial markets, banks are known as one of the most
prominent means of channeling savings to investments with highest re-
turn.3 Through providing liquidity and permitting the eﬃcient pooling of
risk, their activities alter the composition of capital in a way that is poten-
tially favorable to enhanced capital accumulation. As banks have monitor-
ing power delegated by their depositors, they also specialize in gathering
information about ﬁrms and reduce corporate myopia by overcoming the
problems associated with informational asymmetry (e.g., Leland and Pyle
1977 and Diamond 1984). In particular, several previous studies empha-
sized the special role of banks not only in selecting borrowers but also in
monitoring their ex post performance (see, among others, Aoki 1994 and
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein 1991). If banks could prevent unneces-
sary liquidation, these monitoring activities would have a positive impact
on economic growth. However, eﬃcient ex post monitoring activities also
mean that the debt maturity composition becomes shorter. Thus, they
could increase the probability of a liquidity shortage in the sense of Dia-
mond and Dybvig (1983) if panicking external creditors became unwilling
to roll over existing short-term credits.4 In particular, without prudential
2. The only exception is portfolio investment in Thailand, which remained positive after
the crisis. However, other investments in Thailand took large negative values after the crisis.
3. Noting these roles of banks, classical studies by Patrick (1966), Cameron (1967), Gold-
smith (1969), McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973) asserted that the extent of ﬁnancial inter-
mediation in an economy aﬀects rates of economic growth. See also World Bank (1989) and
Fry (1995) for their surveys.
4. See also Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) and Chang and Velasco (1998) in the interna-
tional market.
120 Shin-ichi Fukudaregulation or a safety net, the liquidity problems of private bank loans
may be intensiﬁed in the international capital market.
The purpose of this paper is to present a simple theoretical explanation
of why eﬃcient monitoring activities by banks may increase the probabil-
ity of a liquidity shortage in the competitive international bank loan mar-
ket.5 The theoretical model of this paper extends Diamond (1991, 1993),
who formulated the choice of a loan’s term structure by private ﬁrms under
asymmetric information.6 The model contains a liquidity risk because in-
ternal funds are not suﬃcient. When a liquidity shortage develops, borrow-
ers lose the control right, and the project will be liquidated. This indicates
that when the manager’s control rent is large, long-term debt will be pre-
ferred by the ﬁrm to eliminate the liquidity risk.7 However, when asymmet-
ric information exists between lenders and borrowers, short-term debt low-
ers a good borrower’s expected ﬁnancing costs because of a possible arrival
of good information. Thus, when an arrival of new credit information is
imminent, borrowers tend to prefer short-term debt (see Flannery 1986).
Note that monitoring activities will be enhanced when an arrival of new
information is used. The theory then predicts that eﬃcient monitoring ac-
tivities by banks tend to make the debt maturity shorter. Unless unneces-
sary liquidation took place, short-term loans with eﬃcient monitoring
would have a positive eﬀect on economic growth. However, when neither
prudential regulation nor a safety net is well established, panicky capital
outﬂows may occur with some probability. In such a case, eﬃcient moni-
toring activities by banks can increase the possibility of having cata-
strophic liquidity problems by shortening the maturities of bank loans.
The paper proceeds as follows. Before presenting a theoretical model,
section 4.2 will show that middle-term and long-term commercial bank
loans are less mobile forms of capital ﬂows. It will also show that a large
fraction of external bank debt had been ﬁnanced by short-term loans not
only in the East Asian countries but also in a large number of other coun-
tries. Section 4.3 will then focus on the role of monitoring in explaining
these ﬁndings. Section 4.4 will explain a basic structure of our theoretical
model, and section 4.5 will deﬁne long-term and short-term debt contracts.
Section 4.6 will investigate the maturity choices by all borrowers and show
that the vulnerable ﬁnancial structures in developing countries might
emerge as a result of eﬃcient monitoring activities by banks. Sections 4.7
and 4.8 will discuss how the main results will change when I alter one of
the key assumptions in the model. Section 4.9 will summarize our results
and refer to their policy implications.
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5. In previous studies, Rodrik and Velasco (1999) made an exceptional attempt to analyze
the choice of short-term debt in the international market. However, they did not assume the
asymmetric information, which is crucial in this paper.
6. See also Fukuda, Ji, and Nakamura (1998).
7. Another case in which long-term debt may be preferred by borrowers is when borrowers
have moral hazard problem. See Rajan (1992).4.2 Maturity Distribution of Bank Loans Before and After the Crisis
4.2.1 Growth Rates of Bank Loans to East Asia
As we discussed in the introduction, a large fraction of liabilities in
highly mobile forms of capital was one of the main reasons for the East
Asian crisis in 1997. In particular, the East Asian crisis occurred when
foreign lenders suddenly refused to roll over their bank loans in 1997.
However, when I look at the time series data of international bank loans
based on the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) data, I ﬁnd that the
degree of capital mobility was quite diﬀe r e n ti nd i ﬀerent terms to maturity.
For example, table 4.3 shows the semiannual growth rates of international
bank loans to the East Asian economies before and after the crisis in three
diﬀerent types of maturities: maturities up to one year (short-term loans),
maturities over one year and up to two years (medium-term loans), and
maturities over two years (long-term loans).8
It suggests that until 1997, bank loans to the East Asian economies had
steadily increased in almost all terms to maturity. In Thailand from 1994
to 1995, the average semiannual growth rate of short-term loans was close
to 20 percent, and those of middle-term and long-term loans were slightly
higher than 20 percent. Similarly, both short-term and long-term loans
grew on average about 10 percent in Indonesia and about 15 percent in
Korea from 1994 to 1996.
In contrast, after the crisis, bank loans declined sharply only for short-
term loans. For example, in Korea the semiannual growth rate of short-
term loans was 16.12 percent in December 1997 and 44.23 percent in
June 1998 (see ﬁg. 4.1). During the same period, however, the semiannual
growth rates of middle-term and long-term loans were still signiﬁcantly
positive in Korea (see ﬁg. 4.2 and ﬁg. 4.3). Similarly, almost all of the other
East Asian economies experienced signiﬁcant declines of short-term loans
from December 1997 to June 1998. However, except for Thailand in De-
cember 1997, they experienced no serious decline in middle-term and long-
term loans for the same period. Instead, several East Asian economies
experienced signiﬁcant increases in middle-term and long-term loans dur-
ing this period (see ﬁg. 4.2 and ﬁg. 4.3).
4.2.2 Shares of Short-Term Loans in East Asia
In general, liquidity problems emerge when panicking external creditors
become unwilling to roll over existing credits. Thus, if panicking external
creditors could cancel their long-term contracts, liquidity problems might
have occurred even when external liabilities were ﬁnanced by long-term
8. The data sources are BIS (1996) for the data from 94.6 to 95.12, BIS (1998b) for the



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.loans. However, the evidence in the East Asian economies suggests that
like direct investment, long-term commercial loans were less mobile forms
of capital ﬂows. This may imply that if a large fraction of international
commercial bank debt took the form of long-term loans, the East Asian
crisis might not have taken place—at least not as a liquidity shortage.
In reality, a large fraction of international commercial bank debt was
ﬁnanced by short-term loans in the East Asian economies. Table 4.4,
based on the BIS data, shows how the maturity of international bank loans
was distributed before and after the crisis for three diﬀerent types of matu-
rities. Among the East Asian economies, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singa-
pore had remarkably high shares of short-term loans. Needless to say,
these data are not enough to capture general situations in East Asia before
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Fig. 4.1 Short-term loans before and after the East Asian crisis
Fig. 4.2 Medium-term loans before and after the East Asian crisisthe crisis because Taiwan has been a net creditor, whereas Hong Kong
and Singapore are large international ﬁnancial and intermediation centers.
However, even in the other East Asian economies, shares of short-term
loans were relatively high in the early 1990s (e.g., 72.0 percent in Thailand,
70.6 percent in Korea in December 1993, etc.).
Because bank loans steadily expanded in almost all terms to maturity,
the shares of short-term loans in these East Asian economies slightly de-
clined before the crisis. However, even just before the crisis, these East
Asian economies still had relatively high shares of short-term loans, which
made their ﬁnancial structure vulnerable to a liquidity shortage. The crisis
in 1997 caused a signiﬁcant decline only in short-term loans. As a result,
the shares of short-term loans in these East Asian economies dropped to
nearly 50 percent in 1998.
4.2.3 Shares of Short-Term Loans in the International Market
BIS provides detailed data on the maturity distribution of cross-border
loans from BIS reporting banks. Based on this data set, table 4.5 decom-
poses the cross-border bank loans by region and generates average shares
of short-term loans for many emerging countries as well as developed
countries. It indicates that even the world average share of short-term
loans was above 50 percent throughout the 1990s. Among the diﬀerent
regions, Eastern Europe had lower shares of short-term loans, whereas
oﬀshore banking centers had very large shares of short-term loans in gen-
eral. Compared to developed countries, developing countries had relatively
larger shares of short-term loans. Because liquidity problems emerge when
external creditors become unwilling to roll over existing short-term credits,
the evidence implies that many developing countries could have had liquid-
ity problems.
Impacts of Bank Loans on Economic Development 125



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.In the table, average shares of short-term loans in Asia were above 60
percent throughout the periods.9 This implies that a typical country in the
East Asian region had a more vulnerable composition of external debt
than did other developing countries. However, even compared to the world
standard, shares of short-term loans in the East Asian economies were not
necessarily outliers except for Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Figure
4.4 is a histogram of short-term loan shares in 180 countries that received
the BIS reporting banks’ loans in December 1996. It shows that short-
term loan shares are greater than 70 percent in a large number of countries
in the world. Among the East Asian economies, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and
Singapore are three of the outliers that are included in the range over 80
percent. However, except for these economies, Korea is the only East
Asian economy included in the range over 70 percent. This implies that
shares of short-term loans in the East Asian economies before the crisis
were not remarkable outliers even in the world standard.
4.3 Previous Discussions on the Role of Monitoring
In the last section, I showed that middle-term and long-term commer-
cial bank loans were less mobile capital ﬂows in the sense that they never
declined, even when panicking external creditors became unwilling to roll
over existing short-term credits. However, we also showed that a large frac-
tion of external bank debt had been ﬁnanced by short-term loans not only
in the East Asian countries but also in a large number of countries, which
might have made several developing countries vulnerable to liquidity prob-
lems. The result may partly be inﬂuenced by regulatory factors such as
domestic government regulations, the BIS risk-weighted capital adequacy
regulation, and so on. However, the world-wide evidence cannot be ex-
plained solely by the regulatory factors.
The purpose of the following sections is to present a simple theoretical
model in which ﬁnancial structures in developing countries may become
vulnerable as a result of eﬃcient monitoring by competitive foreign banks.
In general, it is important for the suppliers of funds (or their agents) to
monitor borrowers in order to ensure that funds are used appropriately. In
particular, in order to reduce information costs and the costs of duplicate
monitoring, the monitoring is usually delegated to ﬁnancial intermediaries
rather than performed by individual investors. In the literature, banks are
typical ﬁnancial intermediaries of such delegated monitors (see Diamond
1984).
In many cases, outside investors are not as well informed beforehand
regarding the proﬁtability and risk potential of proposed projects. The
monitoring is thus considered economically valuable because it can reduce
Impacts of Bank Loans on Economic Development 129
9. For example, in December 1996, the share of short-term loans in Bangladesh was 70.4






































sthe degree of the adverse selection problem. It may also be a necessary
response to the problem of moral hazard arising from informational asym-
metry. In some cases, ex ante monitoring may be performed by investment
banks acting as underwriters, by venture capital ﬁrms, and so on. Interim
monitoring may also be provided by rating companies in that they keep
track of the changing ﬁnancial state of the ﬁrm. However, directly placed
debt (commercial paper) is usually a contract with terms (covenants).
Thus, investors need to base their decisions only on public information,
including the borrower’s track record. In contrast, the contract of a bank
loan uses not only public information but also information from costly
monitoring of borrower’s actions. Consequently, monitoring of private in-
formation can be delegated to banks more eﬃciently than it can be col-
lected by other ﬁnancial institutions or many individual investors.
In the following model, we consider the choice of bank loan maturity
in an international ﬁnancial market. In particular, we investigate how the
eﬃciency of banks’ monitoring can aﬀect the choice of bank loan matu-
rity. Without the possibility of liquidity shortage due to herd behavior, the
choice of bank loan maturity in the international market is similar to that
in the domestic market. However, because neither prudential regulation
nor a safety net (e.g., deposit insurance) tends to be established well in
the emerging market, a liquidity shortage is more likely to occur in the
competitive international ﬁnancial market as the bank loan maturity be-
comes shorter.
4.4 The Model
We consider a small open economy model that modiﬁes Diamond’s
(1991, 1993) closed-economy model. In the small open economy, domestic
borrowers (that is, domestic ﬁrms or domestic ﬁnancial institutions) need
to fund their indivisible investment projects from foreign banks. As in
McKinnon and Pill (1996) and Krugman (1998), I assume that domestic
borrowers directly own capital and engage in investment projects. Strictly
speaking, the assumption may be too restrictive for domestic ﬁnancial in-
stitutions because they generally lend money instead of buying capital
assets outright. However, lending to a very highly leveraged ﬁrm that en-
gages in risky projects is very much like buying the capital directly. Thus,
the assumption holds approximately true for a large number of domestic
ﬁnancial institutions in developing countries.10
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10. In fact, the data seem to show that the maturity distributions of international loans
indicate no signiﬁcant diﬀerence depending on the fact that most domestic borrowers are
domestic ﬁrms or domestic ﬁnancial institutions. For example, in Indonesia a large number
of domestic ﬁrms directly borrowed from foreign banks before the crisis. However, I could
not ﬁnd evidence that the maturity distributions in Indonesia were signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from those of other East Asian countries in table 4.4.In the model are three dates: 0, 1, and 2. All projects require the ﬁxed
amount of K in capital at date 0 and produce cash ﬂows only at date 2
(none at date 1). At date 0, each borrower has no internal (domestic) fund
or outside equity. Thus, at date 0, a borrower needs to fund external debt
of K from foreign banks for the project.
Both domestic borrowers and foreign lenders (that is, foreign banks) are
risk neutral. Foreign banks consume only at date 2 and have a constant
returns-to-scale investment technology that returns R per unit invested per
period. One unit invested at date 0 produces returns of R units at date 1;
and if this is invested until date 2, the terminal value will be R2. There are
many potential foreign banks that all observe the same information. Thus,
borrowers face a competitive international loan market at each date and
can borrow as long as lenders receive an expected return of R per period
per unit loaned.
Borrowers’ technological environments are summarized in ﬁgure 4.5.
When successful, each borrower’s project yields a cash ﬂow of X. It also
produces a nonassignable control rent of C if the management has control
right at date 2. Examples of the nonassignable control rent might be the
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Fig. 4.5 Technological environments of borrowersmanager’s desire to keep his business going, the manager’s consumption
of perquisites, or the manager’s disutility from dismissing long-standing
employees. I assume that X 	 R2K and C 	 0.
The project can be liquidated at date 1 for a liquidation value of L.
Because C 	 0, no borrowers have an incentive to liquidate their projects
by themselves. However, foreign banks liquidate their borrower’s project
at date 1 either when its expected present value is less than L or when a
ﬁnancial panic occurs against the borrower. If a project is liquidated, it
produces no cash ﬂows nor control rents at date 2. In addition, the liquida-
tion value of L is assumed to be less than RK. This implies that a successful
project always yields a higher cash ﬂow when not liquidated.
There are two types of borrowers. The two types of borrowers diﬀer
only in the probability that their projects are successful at date 2. The
types of borrowers are characterized as follows.
Type G borrower: T h ep r o j e c ts u c c e e d sf o rs u r ea td a t e2 .
Type B borrower: The project returns succeed with probability q but fail
with probability 1  q, where qX 
 R2K.
Because the control rent of C is positive, borrowers never liquidate their
projects when they have the control right to force the liquidation. However,
since X 	 R2K 	 qX, the type B borrower’s project has a negative net
present value in terms of cash ﬂows. Thus, when foreign banks ﬁnd out
that the borrower is type B, the type B borrower cannot raise funds.
The key assumption in this model is that a project’s ex ante prospects
are private information observed only by the domestic borrower. No one
but the borrower knows his own type. Each foreign bank’s information set
on borrowers’ type, which is summarized in ﬁgure 4.6, is as follows.
At date 0 (the initial period), a foreign bank only knows that its domes-
tic borrower is type G with probability f and type B with probability 1  f.
I assume that
(1) RK f fqX
2 1 ≤+ − [( ) ] .
This assumption implies that on average the project has a positive net
present value in terms of cash ﬂows. The assumption is realistic for devel-
oping countries with high growth rates such as the East Asian economies
before the crisis. It is, however, restrictive for stagnated developing coun-
tries or countries in crisis because the average project has low net present
value in these countries. In section 4.8 I will discuss how the main results
change when the assumption does not hold.
At date 1, each foreign bank’s monitoring partially reveals types of do-
mestic borrowers. That is, the monitoring identiﬁes some type G and type
B borrowers, but it cannot identify all type G and type B borrowers. Deﬁne
e as the probability that the monitoring identiﬁes the type among type G
borrowers at date 1 and m as the probability that the monitoring identiﬁes
the type among type B borrowers at date 1. Then, given the previous
Impacts of Bank Loans on Economic Development 133assumptions, Bayes law implies that a borrower whose type was not identi-
ﬁed at date 1 is type G with probability (1  e)f/[(1  e)f  (1  m)(1 
f )] and type B with probability (1m)(1 f )/[(1 e)f(1m)(1 f )].
It is easy to see that the larger e and m are, the more eﬃcient the foreign
bank’s monitoring is. However, the revealed information at date 1 is not
veriﬁable, so contracts contingent on it are not enforceable in the interna-
tional capital market. Thus, only when a short-term loan is chosen, reﬁ-




A long-term loan is bank debt ﬂoated at date 0 that matures at date 2,
with no reﬁnancing at date 1. The face value r L of this debt is set so that
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Fig. 4.6 Information structure of foreign banksforeign banks can obtain the expected return of R2 per unit invested. Un-
der the assumption that qX 
 R2K  [ f  (1  f )q]X, we can verify that
the equilibrium with long-term loans is a pooling equilibrium, realizing
that debt is repaid with probability f  (1  f )q. Thus, as long as r L  X,
the face value of a long-term loan is given by11
(2) rR K f f q
L =+ −
2 1 /[ ( ) ].
The lower f is, the higher is the promised interest r L, owing to the higher
default rate of type B borrowers. In other words, reﬂecting a risk premium,
the long-term interest rate becomes higher as the proportion of type B
borrowers becomes larger.
Recall that at date 1, each foreign bank’s monitoring might reveal infor-
mation about some type G and type B borrowers. However, the informa-
tion does not inﬂuence the face value of long-term loan and does not lead
to liquidation because long-term lenders have no such rights.12 Therefore,
the payoﬀ of a type G borrower with a long-term loan is equal to
(3)  g
LL XCr
XCR K f f q
=+−
=+− +−
2 1 /[ ( ) ],
which is independent of e and m (i.e., the degree of foreign banks’ monitor-
ing eﬃciency).
On the other hand, the expected payoﬀ of a type B borrower with long-
term loan is equal to
(4)  b
LL qX C r
qX C q RK f fq
=+ −
=+ − + −
()
() / [ ( ) ] .
2 1





A short-term loan is bank debt ﬁnanced at date 0, maturing at date 1
with face value r1. At date 1, the short-term loan can be either reﬁnanced
or repaid, at least partially, by liquidation of the project. If the short-term
loan is rolled over at date 1, the reﬁnanced short-term loan matures at
date 2. The reﬁnanced short-term loan at date 1 has diﬀerent face values
depending on the realization of date 1 information. Each face value of the
short-term loan issued at date 1 is set so that foreign banks at date 1 get
11. If r L 	 X, borrowers cannot issue long-term debt because they cannot provide lenders
with an expected return of R2K. Because R2K  [ f  (1  f )q]X, we can rule out this
possibility in the following analysis.
12. When C is small, renegotiation between lenders and borrowers may be possible. How-
ever, assuming that C is large enough rules out this possibility.
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borrower at that date.
Short-term borrowers who were identiﬁed as type G at date 1 will suc-
ceed the project with a probability of 1. Thus, unless a ﬁnancial panic
occurs, each of them can always reﬁnance to pay the full face value of the
debt r1 at date 0. Noting that a new short-term loan maturing at date 2 is
repaid with probability 1, the face value of this short-term loan issued at
date 1, which is denoted by rB, satisﬁes
(5)
B rr R =
1 .
However, the determination of the face value of a short-term loan issued
at date 1 is more complicated for borrowers whose type was not identiﬁed,
because even if no ﬁnancial panic occurs, the borrowers might not be able
to reﬁnance to pay the full face value of their date 0 debt. In the following
sections (up to section 4.8), I consider the case in which foreign banks
always choose liquidation when their monitoring cannot identify the type
of borrowers at date 1.13 In this case, foreign banks liquidate their borrow-
er’s project at date 1 either when their monitoring cannot identify the bor-
rower’s type, when their monitoring identiﬁes the borrower as type B, or
when a ﬁnancial panic occurs in this lending market. I assume that even
if the borrower was identiﬁed as type G, a ﬁnancial panic occurs for him
with probability 1  .
Because lenders can identify type G borrowers out of all borrowers with
the probability fe at date 1, the expected rate return for a date 0 short-term
lender is fe r1  (1  fe)L, where L is a liquidation value of the project.
Equating this to the one-period riskless return RK leads to
(6) rR K f e L f e
1 1 =− − [( ) ] / ( ) , 
so that equations (5) and (6) lead to
(7)
B rR K f e L R f e =− − [( ) ] / ( ) . 1 
Because RK  L,b o t hr1 and rB are decreasing in f. Thus, the short-term
interest rates also become higher as the proportion of type B borrowers
becomes larger, due to a risk premium.14
The payoﬀ of a type G borrower with a short-term loan is
(8a) when the project is not liquidated at date 1,
B XCr +−
13. This case is more likely when the bank’s monitoring reveals more type G borrowers
than type B borrowers. I think that the case is realistic because type G borrowers have an
incentive to reveal their type, but type B borrowers do not.
14. Because X is the maximum amount that type G borrowers can repay for the banks, rB
needs to be less than X for the short-term loans to be supplied. In the following analysis, I
implicitly guarantee this condition assuming that R2K  (1  fe)RL  feX.
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(8b) when the project is liquidated at date 1. 0
Because the ex ante probability that the project is liquidated at date 1 is
e at date 0, the expected payoﬀ of a type G borrower with a short-term
loan S a td a t e0i s
(9)
B  g
S eX C r
eX C R L f RR K L
=+ −




() ( / ) ( ) . 1
Because all type G borrowers are identical at date 0, S
g is common for all
type G borrowers. It is easy to see that S
g is increasing in e (i.e., the degree
of foreign banks’ eﬃciency to sort out type G borrowers). However, it is
independent of m (i.e., the degree of foreign banks’ eﬃciency to sort out
type B borrowers).
4.6 The Maturity Choice by Borrowers
In our model, domestic borrowers choose the maturity of their external
loans at date 0 in order to maximize their expected payoﬀs. However, be-
cause qX 
 R2K, choosing a maturity that only type B borrowers would
prefer would reveal that the borrower was type B, and no loan would be
made to him. Therefore, as long as the expected payoﬀ rate of a type B
borrower is positive, the maturity of a bank loan that is chosen by type G
borrowers is also chosen by type B borrowers. Assuming the existence of
such a pooling equilibrium, this indicates that all borrowers choose short-
term loans if L
g 
 S
g but choose long-term loans otherwise.
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Thus, in this international ﬁnancial market all domestic borrowers choose
short-term loans if and only if
(11) ( )( ) ()
[( ) ]
() . 1 1
1












Equation (11) has two noteworthy implications for the terms to maturity
in international bank loans. The ﬁrst is that given other parameters, an
increase in  makes equation (11) more probable. Because  denotes the
probability that a ﬁnancial panic will not occur, this implies that foreign
banks tend to choose short-term loans when they are optimistic about the
Impacts of Bank Loans on Economic Development 137borrowers’ ﬁnancial conditions. The intuition behind this result is that
when lenders perceive that liquidity risk is small, long-term contracts ap-
pear less attractive for lenders.
Because foreign lenders were optimistic about the precrisis East Asian
economies, the result can explain why the East Asian economies had com-
paratively higher shares of short-term loans in the world standard before
the crisis.15 It may also imply that some optimistic conﬁdence made the
precrisis East Asian economies vulnerable to the crisis not only through
increasing the total amount of external liabilities but also through making
their terms to maturity shorter.
The second noteworthy implication is that given other parameters, an
increase in e makes equation (11) more probable. Because the value of e is
a proxy for the degree of monitoring eﬃciency, this implies that borrowers
tend to choose short-term loans when monitoring can make use of new
information arrival eﬃciently. In general, short-term debt can lower a
good borrower’s expected ﬁnancing cost because of a possible arrival of
good information. Thus, when lenders can make use of additional credit
information arrival more eﬃciently by ex post monitoring, short-term debt
will be preferred in debt contracts.
The latter implication is important in considering the choice of bank
loan maturity because banks usually have better monitoring abilities than
do other ﬁnancial intermediaries. The result generally predicts that eﬃ-
cient monitoring activities by banks tend to make the debt maturity com-
position shorter. Without the possibility of unnecessary liquidation, the
eﬃcient monitoring might have a positive eﬀect on economic welfare.
However, without prudential regulation or a safety net in the international
ﬁnancial market, the eﬃciency of banks’ monitoring can increase the pos-
sibility that an otherwise solvent country may suﬀer a short-run liquidity
problem. The negative consequence is particularly likely when the avail-
able stock of reserves is low relative to the overall burden of external
debt service.
This theoretical result is consistent with the empirical fact that a large
fraction of external bank debt had been ﬁnanced by short-term loans in a
large number of countries, which might make several developing countries
vulnerable to liquidity problems. In particular, because the East Asian
crisis took the form of a pure liquidity shortage in private bank loans, the
experience of several Asian countries in 1997 may provide striking ex-
amples of such negative consequences of eﬃcient bank monitoring.
15. In table 4.4, one ﬁnds remarkably high shares of short-term loans in Taiwan. This
ﬁnding may be consistent with our result because large amounts of foreign reserves made a
ﬁnancial panic least likely in Taiwan.
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I have discussed how the maturity of bank loans is determined in the
competitive international ﬁnancial market. The results are, however, based
on several assumptions that may not be relevant for some developing coun-
tries. For example, my simple theoretical model did not take into account
several regulatory factors in the international loan market. In reality, the
maturity structure of international bank loans may have been inﬂuenced
not only by the government policy to regulate long-term capital inﬂows
but also by the regulations on foreign banks such as the BIS risk-weighted
capital regulation, which favors short-term loans. In terms of this theoreti-
cal analysis, these regulatory factors can be modeled as taxes on long-term
loans. Thus, if these factors exist, short-term loans would be chosen even
under relatively milder conditions in our model.
In addition, this model assumed that borrowers face a competitive inter-
national loan market. The assumption may be justiﬁed when a large num-
ber of potential foreign lenders are in the international loan market. In
particular, the assumption may be realistic for the East Asian economies
before the crisis, during which time many foreign banks competed with
others in the loan market under the lending boom. However, in several
developing countries, private loans from foreign banks took the form of
syndicated loans. Under such circumstances, borrowers in developing
countries did not necessarily face a competitive international loan market.
Without rigorous analyses, it is not clear how the main results will
change when foreign banks have some monopolistic power in the interna-
tional loan market. However, even when the international loan market is
not competitive, it is always true that eﬃcient monitoring activities can
make use of new information arrival more eﬃciently under asymmetric
information between lenders and borrowers. Thus, I conjecture that under
some mild conditions, monopolistic foreign banks can still have an incen-
tive to choose short-term loans when they have better monitoring abilities.
Finally, our model assumed equation (1), under which the average proj-
ect in the economy has a positive net present value. In general, however,
we cannot rule out the case in which equation (1) does not hold. In fact,
equation (1) does not hold when the average project in the economy has a
negative net present value in terms of cash ﬂows, i.e., when R2K 	 [ f  (1
 f )q]X. I think that the case is unrealistic for the East Asian economies
before the crisis because their expected growth rates were very high. How-
ever, it may hold true for several stagnant developing countries where the
percentage of bad quality borrowers in the economy is large.
When R2K 	 [ f  (1  f )q]X holds in the model, a long-term loan is
never supplied by foreign banks at date 0 because foreign banks cannot
get the expected rate return of R2. However, as long as R2K  (1  fe)RL
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This implies that when the average project in the economy has a negative
net present value, foreign banks provide only short-term loans to the
economy.
Although the analysis focused on international bank lending, the result
may be extended to explain several noteworthy events in the international
bond market for some stagnant developing countries.16 For example, in
1994 foreign investors refused to purchase long-term Mexican government
bonds because of the likelihood of a devaluation of the Mexican peso. As
a result, in Mexico the term structure of government bonds shifted to the
shortend before the eventual crisis in December 1994.17 Similarly, in 1998
foreign investors became skeptical about the sustainability of ﬁscal deﬁcits
in Russia. As a result, they shifted their investment to short-term Russian
bonds before the eventual devaluation of the ruble.18 Although these events
happened in the bond market rather than in the loan market, they are
consistent with the previous discussions, which allowed for the case that
R2K 	 [ f  (1  f )q]X in our model.
4.8 Some Extensions
In previous sections, I have considered the case in which foreign banks
always choose liquidation when their monitoring cannot identify the type
of borrowers at date 1. However, when the bank’s monitoring reveals more
type B borrowers than it does type G borrowers, this case becomes less
likely because the percentage of type G borrowers becomes larger among
unidentiﬁed borrowers. In this section, I discuss how our main results
would change if foreign banks never liquidate the projects of unidentiﬁed
borrowers at date 1.19
For analytical simplicity, we assume that the probability of a ﬁnancial
panic is 0 (i.e., 1). Then, when the projects of unidentiﬁed borrowers
are never liquidated, foreign banks liquidate the borrower’s project at date
1 if and only if the monitoring identiﬁes the borrower as type B. Because
the percentage of identiﬁed type B borrowers among all borrowers is m(1
 f ) at date 1, this implies that the expected rate of return for a date 0
short-term lender is equal to [1  m(1  f )]r1  m(1  f )L, where r1 is
the face value of short-term loan issued at date at date 0, maturing at
date 1. Equating this to the one-period riskless return RK leads to
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16. The following arguments were suggested by Takatoshi Ito.
17. The Mexican government also had to issue dollar-linked government bonds.
18. However, investors were to be surprised at eventual de facto default of the bonds.
19. However, I do not think that the case where the bank’s monitoring reveals type B
borrowers more than it does type G borrowers is realistic in many countries because type G
borrowers have an incentive to reveal their type, but type B borrowers do not.(12) rR K m f L m f
1 11 1 =− − − − [( ) ] / [ ( ) ] .
Recall that at date 1 unidentiﬁed borrowers are type G with probability
(1  e)f/[(1  e)f  (1  m)(1  f )] and type B with probability (1 
m)(1  f )/[(1  e)f  (1  m)(1  f )]. Recall also that type G borrowers
succeed for sure and that type B borrowers succeed with probability q at
date 2. Then, when a new short-term loan is supplied to them at date 1,
the new short-term loan maturing at date 2 is repaid with probability
[(1  e)f  (1  m)(1  f )q]/[(1  e)f  (1  m)(1  f )]. This implies
that the face value of a short-term loan issued for unidentiﬁed borrowers
at date 1, which is denoted by rC, needs to satisfy
(13) ( ) () ()
( ) () ()
. 11 1
11 1
1 −+ − −
−+ − −




For borrowers who were identiﬁed as type G, the face value of a short-
term loan issued at date 1, rB, is determined by equation (5), that is, rB 
r1R. Therefore, equations (5), (12), and (13) lead to
(14)
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When the project of unidentiﬁed borrowers is never liquidated, the pay-
oﬀ of a type G borrower with short-term loan is written as
(16a) when the type is identified at date 1,
B XCr +−
and
(16b) when the type is not identified at date 1. XCr
C +−
Because a type G borrower is identiﬁed at date 1 with probability e, the
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As was S
g in equation (9), S
g in equation (17) depends on the parameter
e. However, contrary to S
g in equation (9), S
g in equation (17) also de-
pends on the parameter m, i.e., the degree of foreign banks’ eﬃciency to
sort out type B borrowers.
Subtracting equation (17) from equation (3) leads to






SL C re r e r




−= − ++ −





( ) () () [ ( ) ]












that all domestic borrowers choose short-term loans if and only if rL 	 e
rB  (1  e)rC,o re q u i v a l e n t l y ,
(19)
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After some tedious calculation, I can verify that given other parameters,
an increase in e makes the inequality in equation (19) more probable. Thus,
even in cases in which unidentiﬁed borrowers are never liquidated, foreign
banks that have the better monitoring ability to sort out type G borrowers
will tend to choose short-term loans.
In contrast, the eﬀect of the parameter m on equation (19) is not clear
in general. In particular, when L is small enough, an increase in m makes
the inequality in equation (19) less probable. Thus, under some circum-
stances foreign banks with better monitoring ability to sort out type B
borrowers may choose long-term loans. However, when L is close to RK,
an increase in m makes the inequality in equation (19) more probable.
Thus, at least when a liquidation value is large, foreign banks with better
monitoring ability to sort out type B borrowers can tend to choose short-
term loans even when unidentiﬁed borrowers are never liquidated.
4.9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I ﬁrst demonstrated that middle-term and long-term com-
mercial bank loans are less mobile forms of external liabilities. I also
showed that a large fraction of external bank debt had been ﬁnanced by
short-term loans not only in the East Asian countries but also in a large
number of other countries. I then presented a simple theoretical model in
which the ﬁnancial structure may become vulnerable as a result of banks’
eﬃcient monitoring activities.
In the literature of corporate ﬁnance, a large number of studies stressed
the positive role of banks as delegated monitors that specialize in gather-
ing information about borrowers. It is probably true that when government
regulations are established well in the ﬁnancial market, the eﬃc i e n tr o l eo f
banks as delegated monitors unambiguously improves economic welfare.
For example, in Japan during the 1950s and 1960s, nearly 90 percent of
loans supplied by the city and local banks were short-term funds whose
142 Shin-ichi Fukudaterms to maturity was less than one year (see table 4.6). If a ﬁnancial panic
was likely, the ﬁnancial structure in Japan would have been vulnerable to
a liquidity shortage. However, under strict administrative regulations, a
ﬁnancial panic never occurred in Japan during the 1950s and 1960s. As a
result, short-term loans made a signiﬁcant contribution for remarkable
economic growth in postwar Japan under the regulated ﬁnancial market.
Unfortunately, we can expect neither satisfactory government regulation
nor a safety net (say, deposit insurance) in the current international ﬁnan-
cial market. Given the circumstances, eﬃcient monitoring activities by
competitive banks are not necessarily desirable. In other words, interna-
tional bank lending may have an ironic consequence that an improvement
of bank’s monitoring ability can increase the possibility of an unnecessary
liquidity shortage and may have a negative eﬀect on economic growth.
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Comment Takatoshi Ito
I have two kinds of comments on Fukuda’s paper. First, I will examine the
plausibility of the basic assumptions on information asymmetry and their
implications; second, I will comment on the data interpretation.
Basic Assumptions
This paper sets up a theoretical model of asymmetric information on
bank lending, motivated by recent problems in international bank lending
to Asian countries (as shown by the author, citing statistics collected by
the Bank for International Settlements [BIS]). Given how important inter-
national bank lending has been in Asian economies, both positively (be-
fore the crisis) and negatively (during the crisis), a contribution on under-
standing banks’ lending behavior is welcome.
In Fukuda’s model, borrowers know that they are of either good type
(higher probability to succeed) or bad type (lower probability to succeed).
Lenders cannot distinguish between them when making bank loans, unless
they behave diﬀerently. Lending can be made for either one period or two
periods; bank monitoring reveals some of the good borrowers after one
period. Knowing this monitoring activity, good-type borrowers have in-
centive to borrow short (one-period loans) in the hope that they may be
identiﬁed as being of good type. The tradeoﬀ for going short is that, after
one period, there may be a bank run, and even good-type borrowers would
not have a rollover of bank loans. Without a rollover, only a fraction of a
project is recovered in the process of liquidation. If good-type borrowers
choose to borrow short, then bad-type borrowers must also borrow short
in order to avoid being identiﬁed as bad. Comparative statics shows that
if the proportion of the good-type borrower is higher, then good-type
borrowers tend to borrow short. If monitoring to identify good-type bor-
rowers after one period becomes more accurate, good-borrowers tend to
borrow short.
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sity, Tokyo, and a research associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.This conclusion is counterintuitive. In the real world, my intuition says,
a good borrower tends to favor a long-term loan, not a short-term loan,
because the good borrower would not like to be caught by liquidity short-
age in the middle of the project. My intuition also says that a lender, not
a borrower, prefers short-term loans if it suspects that there are more bad
borrowers than before, or if the monitoring technique is enhanced to pick
bad borrowers after one period. If Fukuda’s model is right, we should
expect to ﬁnd that bank lending to Asia has a higher short-term lending
ratio in good times (1993–95), while the long-term lending ratio would rise
as the crisis nears (1996–97). This is hard to be conﬁrmed in table 4.3 of
the paper. So, empirically, theoretical prediction is somewhat inconclusive.
In 1994, the maturity structure of Mexican government bonds shifted
to short-term (and dollar indexed) before the eventual crisis in December.
Investors refused to purchase long-term bonds, fearing a devaluation. Sim-
ilarly, short-term Russian bonds (GKOs) in 1998 soared, with investors
becoming increasingly skeptical about the sustainability of ﬁscal deﬁcits
and the level of the ruble. Of course, these are bonds, not bank lending,
which is the focus of the study in the Fukuda paper; but these examples
would suggest the lender’s preference and behavior.
So, the rest of my comments explore why my intuitions are not predicted
by his theory. Basically, I will argue that assumptions of the model are
responsible for these counterintuitive results.
First, monitoring is assumed to distinguish a portion of only good-type
borrowers after one period, but none of the bad-type borrowers. This is
analogous to a situation in which there is only upside risk and no downside
risk in lending. If there is a possibility that bad-type borrowers can be
identiﬁed, then lenders—not borrowers—may want to keep loans in the
short term. Second, in Fukuda’s model, decisions are made only by bor-
rowers; but in the real world, lenders may be more inﬂuential in determin-
ing the maturity structure. Taking the ﬁrst and second comments seriously,
I conjecture the following comparative statistics result. The higher the pro-
portion of bad-type borrowers, the more likely the loans will be of short
term.
Third, there is no interest rate as a market-clearing price. I wonder
whether it is possible to extend the Fukuda model so that the loan demand
function is derived from the borrower’s choice, while the loan supply func-
tion is derived from the lender’s choice. The interest rate is then deter-
mined in equilibrium. Once this is done, then the yield curve (the diﬀer-
ence between the short-term and the long-term interest rates) may be
derived. The slope of the yield curve reﬂects, among other things, the de-
gree of risk to be revealed later (the future short-term interest rate and the
exchange rate ﬂuctuation, for example).
Fourth, in deriving the yield curve as an equilibrium of lender’s and
borrower’s choices, it may be worthwhile to introduce uncertainties about
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changes, and general economic conditions of the country where borrow-
ers reside.
Integrating these comments would make the paper much more relevant
to the real-world problem of international bank lending.
Data Interpretation
Medium-term and long-term loans (that is, those with maturity of one
to two years, and beyond two years, respectively) did not decrease as much
as short-term loans (with maturity of less than one year). From this, Pro-
fessor Fukuda concludes that longer-term loans are less mobile. He tries
to explain the proportion of short- to medium- and long-term loans by
asymmetry of information. However, in reality, these two types of loans
may represent diﬀerent kinds of customers and loan conditions. For ex-
ample, medium- and long-term loans from Japanese banks are directed to
subsidiaries of Japanese companies and may be guaranteed by Japanese
parent companies. Short-term loans may be directed to local banks. Local
banks direct the loans to corporations. What lenders have to do is to mon-
itor local banks’ performance, but not the companies’ performance di-
rectly. If this inference is right, then there is a good reason for the way
loan maturity is chosen and for the mobility of longer-term loans. The
ratio between short-term loans and long-term loans is determined by such
factors as how banks are ﬁnancing foreign direct investment and how
banks obtain parent companies’ guarantees—which are reasons other
than monitoring technology and the ratio of good and bad companies.
The BIS statistics do not tell us information with regard to guarantees,
currency risk exposure, and hedge ratio; it would be diﬃcult to derive
policy implication. Hence, one should be cautious in interpreting the BIS
statistics and the implications of the model.
In summary, this paper raises interesting issues on how a maturity struc-
ture of bank loans is determined. The model highlights the roles of moni-
toring ability and choice by borrowers. It will be interesting to extend the
Fukuda model to include other important factors in loan decisions.
Comment Yukiko Fukagawa
The crisis in East Asia prompted academic and practical interests on the
role of short-term loans in bringing about the crisis. The paper undertakes
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(RIETI).a theoretical analysis of how eﬃcient monitoring by foreign commercial
banks can increase (as opposed to decrease) the possibility of a liquidity
crisis and credit crunch. The result has signiﬁcant implications for an inter-
national ﬁnancial crisis.
Despite the theoretical contribution of the paper, some important fac-
tors seem to have been ignored. As the paper acknowledges, regulatory or
institutional factors such as Bank for International Settlements (BIS) reg-
ulations were not considered in the lenders’ decision-making process. Sev-
eral regulations inﬂuenced the maturity choice for both lenders and bor-
rowers, such as controls on oﬀshore banking and direct controls on the
operation of foreign banks. In some cases, short-term loans were inevitable
simply because there was no market for long-term lending, as in the case
of Thailand. On the lenders’ side, a choice of maturity may be aﬀected
not only by regulations, but also by the lending scheme itself. Even in East
Asia—a region of relatively successful economies—syndicated loans were
still a common form of lending, especially in large-scale projects. Here ma-
turity choice may depend on a liquidation value at date 1 (L in equation
[19] in thepaper), plus cost ofnegotiation with other lenders.The factors of
risk include the existence (or lack) of the host government’s guarantees. In
syndicate loans, therefore, L (for one bank) could be small, and foreign
banksmayperformmonitoringandsortouttypeB;thenthebankmaypre-
fer long-term loans, as was mentioned in the extension section of the paper.
The paper also examines the possibility of alternative assumptions, such
as an uncompetitive loan market for less developed countries, lender mo-
nopoly, and the case of negative present value of the project. In addition to
these, however, there might have been several other factors. For instance,
assumptions about the degree of information asymmetry between domes-
tic and international monitoring can be modeled. The cost of monitoring
in domestic lending is intuitively smaller compared to that in international
lending. Therefore, in practice, instead of incurring the monitoring cost,
foreign banks often opt to rely on secondhand information from major
rating ﬁrms in deciding the credit lines, or simply follow the leading bank’s
decision in a case of herd behavior. When Korean banks started to suﬀer
from spillovers of the Thai crisis, many leaders decided not to roll-over
long-term loans to Korean banks. Foreign banks cut the credit line until
the liquidity completely dried up. This may be the case for eﬃcient moni-
toring, as the model suggests; but if this were to occur in the domestic
market, the information asymmetry might not have been as serious, and
lenders could have accessed ﬁrsthand information on the borrowers eas-
ily taking a diﬀerentiated strategy instead of blind herding.
My third critique concerns the paper’s remark that unless satisfactory
prudential regulations or a safety net is established in the international
ﬁnancial market, improvement of bank monitoring may increase the possi-
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experience in the 1950s–80s, where there was intensive short-term lending
monitored by banks, yet the ﬁnance was sustained for good ﬁrms. How-
ever, even if the institutional environment must be diﬀerent in international
ﬁnance, domestic ﬁnance in the troubled economies could have been the
same way with Japan to prevent the turmoil. So, what was the crucial
diﬀerence? Probably, it was not only international short-term capital allo-
cation that mattered, but also the combination of long-term investments
and borrowed capital in the domestic capital market. This was the case in
Thailand and Indonesia. The maturity mismatch could have been adjusted
in the domestic capital market if only minimal ﬁnancial supervision had
been maintained. Here, the problem in Korea was more serious in that the
borrowing and substantial lending were done in the overseas market. How
supervision could have checked this aspect remains in question.
The model also does not specify the nature of the borrowers—whether
banks, ﬁrms, or both. If foreign banks lend directly to ﬁrms, the model
holds; but if they lend to local banks, the borrowers’ risk is partially up to
domestic intermediaries as well as to foreign lenders to domestic banks.
Domestic banking problems can be alleviated by domestic regulations and
a safety net. Indeed, Malaysia as well as Korea had maintained relatively
strict domestic regulations, and borrowing had been concentrated on local
banks, unlike in Indonesia, where many ﬁrms borrowed directly from for-
eign banks. The restructuring process has been relatively rapid in Korea
and Malaysia, thanks to the regulations on domestic ﬁnance. Therefore,
the probability of liquidity shortfall may be greater with better monitoring
by banks if domestic monitoring remains poor—but this does not deny
the importance of reforms in the domestic market.
Finally, the model assumes that the average project has a positive net
present value, which may not be the case in stagnant economies. As the
paper argues, long-term loans are never supplied by foreign banks at time
0 if the percentage of type B borrowers is substantially large, because when
R2K 	 [ f  (1  f )q]X, R2 cannot be expected. On the other hand, as
long as R2K  (1  fe)RL  feX holds, only short-term loans can be
supplied at time 0, even if the net present value is negative. In fact, in a
very competitive environment banks often try to take the risk of type B
with potentially negative present value by extending short term loans.
Nowadays, with the sophistication of the modern asset liability manage-
ment (ALM) system and complicated risk-hedging techniques, including
various kinds of derivatives, foreign banks may even be willing to continue
short-term lending regardless of the present net value. Therefore, regarding
the massive capital ﬂows to emerging markets as a reﬂection of technologi-
cal development in international ﬁnance, the choice of maturity may be
more complex. The choice of maturity may not depend solely on the type
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value (both at present and in the future in project ﬁnance), or it could be
inﬂuenced by other external valuables such as the risk hedging environ-
ment. However, these suggested challenges to the model do not deny its
original contribution on the subject of the role of foreign banks’ monitor-
ing in short-term lending.
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